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Comment by Professor Frank J. Garcia 
Boston College Law School 
 
ICCA/Queen Mary Task Force on Third Party Funding 
in International Arbitration 
 
 Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Draft Report of the Task 
Force.  The Draft Report clearly represents a great deal of work on the part of the 
Task Force members, and is certain to be an important contribution to the much-
needed public debate and regulatory efforts surrounding third party funding (TPF). 
 
 I have been a professor of International Economic Law (IEL) for over twenty 
years, with a particular interest in structural and institutional questions in trade 
law, and in the fairness of the global economic system as a whole.  My remarks today 
grow out of these long-standing concerns, and reflect my research on the structural 
bases of distributive justice and injustice in IEL.  Because of the significance of 
foreign investment today and growing public concerns over investment treaties, I 
have expanded my research to include investment law. Most recently, I have written 
on the parallels between the current legitimacy crisis in investment law, and the 
earlier legitimacy crisis in trade law (see Garcia et al., Reforming the International 
Investment Regime: Lessons from International Trade Law, 18 Oxford Journal of 
International Economic Law 861 (2015)).  The late 20th century legitimacy crisis in 
trade law signaled/accompanied an important paradigm shift in our understanding 
of the trade regime, from being simply the international law of inter-state 
commerce, towards our recognition of it as a key part of global economic 
governance, responsible for ensuring a fair global economic system for all affected 
stakeholders. I understand the investment crisis today in the same vein, and this 
perspective on investment law as fundamentally entwined with ideas of justice and 
governance informs my remarks today. 
 
 In my view, TPF represents a profound challenge to the fairness and 
legitimacy of the international investment regime, which if not addressed effectively 
will further compromise not only the public’s faith in this system (already 
undermined), but the viability of the system for states and other stakeholders.  The 
Draft Report, while offering useful recommendations for addressing important 
ethical and professional issues raised by TPF, almost entirely sidesteps this 
fundamental, even existential issue. This might suggest to some readers that the 
presence of TPF in ISDS is beyond regulation or review, that there will be no further 
public consideration or regulatory response except to moderate some of its effects. 
One can see in the careful wording of Chapter Eight that the Task Force had to 
contend with strong differences of opinion on this question. Nevertheless, I am 
concerned that by its omissions and elisions the ISDS portions of the Draft Report 
will be read more as a ratification of the status quo with respect to TPF, than as the 
opening contribution to a searching and public-minded regulatory conversation on 
TPF and investment arbitration that the Draft Report suggests it seeks to be. 
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 The fundamental premise of my view on TPF is that the current BIT-based 
international investment regime is fundamentally unbalanced in terms of norms and 
dispute resolution, offering investors a wide range of protections while offering 
states no meaningful basis for claims or counterclaims.  Indeed, Prof. Alessandra 
Arcuri of Erasmus University (in a paper presented at the Graduate Institute of 
Geneva’s 2017 Annual Conference on WTO Law) recently referred to this unbalance 
as “The Great Asymmetry” in international investment law.  While there may be 
valid historical reasons for this asymmetry (see, e.g., Garcia, supra), and the threat to 
the viability and security of foreign investment continues to be real, this asymmetry 
represents today a fundamental flaw in the investment regime from the perspective 
of both governance and fairness, the two parameters critical to both resolving the 
current legitimacy crisis and shaping a more effective investment law regime for the 
21st century.   
 
 TPF is a threat to both governance and fairness because by design it exploits 
this asymmetry in ways that further undercut the regime’s capacity to satisfy even 
basic norms of governance and fairness.  Whatever the risks and merits of TPF in 
commercial arbitration (which I don’t speak to here), TPF within a system as 
unbalanced as the investment law regime is, to put it bluntly, a disaster.  I say this, 
because given the structure of the investment regime today, TPF cannot but have 
the effect of further concentrating economic power in the hands of investors, the 
privileged class of claimants (indeed the only class of claimants) in the current 
regime, by opening the system to the resources (and priorities) of speculative 
investment.  This is exactly the risk that traditional common law doctrines of 
maintenance and champerty were designed to mitigate, and reflects (even 
intensifies) the reasons investment treaties are under such challenge today.  
 
 TPF is a threat to governance, because it further amplifies “voice” on the part 
of a stakeholder whose voice is already the loudest, if not the only, voice officially 
recognized within the system (other than State Respondents, whose voice is 
carefully limited by the asymmetric nature of the substantive rules).  It is a threat to 
fairness, because it intensifies the resources available to a privileged claimant, 
against a responding party with limited substantive rights and no appellate rights, a 
party that is burdened by competing sovereign budgetary responsibilities to many 
stakeholders, and holds a monopoly on the taxing power.  In other words, TPF in 
ISDS gives a small class of investors even more resources to prosecute unbalanced 
claims against a constrained State, claims that in a majority of cases will ultimately 
be paid by a large underrepresented class of stakeholders (the public, who as tax 
payers are the “residual risk-bearers” in the current system).  They will pay in the 
form of additional fiscal or welfare burdens, since both losses and settlements are 
equally burdensome on the public fisc.   
 
 Such imbalances are what international economic law should seek to redress, 
not facilitate.  Business actors will continually seek to concentrate both control and 
profit while transferring risk, and the task of economic law is to identify such 
patterns in every transaction and ensure that an appropriate share of risk always 
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remains with those exercising control and receiving the profits (see, e.g., the work of 
Prof. Joseph Vining). When the law fails to do this, society as a whole suffers, as we 
saw most recently in the Global Financial Crisis.  Here too there are instructive 
parallels: the crisis grew out of a decision to allow speculative investment into the 
mortgage lending industry, an industry designed (albeit imperfectly) to balance the 
social goals of home ownership against the risks of default and the need for a 
sustainable rate of return, within a framework of prudential regulation. On a 
structural level, the decision to allow TPF into ISDS functions along the same lines, 
facilitating the exploitation of the tax-paying public for the benefit of speculative 
investment.  
 
 For these reasons, I would recommend that TPF be barred from all ISDS 
cases until the system is fundamentally reformed both substantively and 
procedurally. At a minimum, ordering mandatory security for costs when a claimant 
is TPF funded, as Dr. Gavan Griffith, Q.C. has advocated in RSM v. St. Lucia, would go 
some way towards addressing this imbalance. Simple disclosure is not, in my view, 
an adequate remedy when the structural defects of the system are so basic and so 
prone to exploitation. Allowing TPF to operate unchecked within ISDS reduces an 
institution designed to address injustice (albeit imperfectly) and maintain order, 
into a mere speculative investment opportunity, which is precisely what traditional 
prohibitions on maintenance and champerty were designed to prevent. Certainly it 
is a step in the right direction to know who is exploiting Arcuri’s Great Asymmetry 
and for whose benefit, but in light of the fundamental inequities described above, it 
cannot be considered an adequate response.   
 
 Although Chapter Eight implies that within the Task Force there would not 
be majority support for recommending such a ban, or even mentioning it, the failure 
to more forthrightly address this issue represents a lost opportunity.  By taking up 
an issue with such financial momentum and potential risk without making any 
concrete recommendations or even directly addressing this dynamic, Chapter Eight 
as written risks being read as complicit in this and against the public good. TPF in 
ISDS does not exist in isolation from the Great Asymmetry, indeed, it appears 
designed to exploit the Great Asymmetry for speculative gain, and the public’s best 
interests are not served by drafting a report that reads as if it did.  
 
 Even a more frank discussion of the interaction between the structural 
characteristics of the contemporary BIT system and TPF as a funding mechanism 
would go a long way towards bolstering the legitimacy and credibility of this part of 
the Draft Report, and indeed would embody the commitment to disclosure that the 
Task Force recommends. Even mentioning the systemic risks and the option of a 
ban—even if balanced by competing recommendations—for the public’s 
consideration, would allow the Task Force to more effectively achieve its stated goal 
of contributing to this larger public debate, and help build the more robust and 
sustainable international investment regime that we all need.  
